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Preface 
The work described in this report was performed by the Quality Assurance and 
Reliability Division of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The program listing for the 
fault tree analysis described in this report is contained in Technical Memorandum 
33-512, Program Listing for Fnttlt Tree Analysis of JPL Twhnical Report 32-1542, 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, Calif., Dec. 1, 1971. 
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Abstract 
A method is presented for calculating event probabilities from an arbitrary fault tree. 
The method includes an analytical derivation of the system equation and is not a 
simulation program. The method can handle systems that incorporate standby 
redundancy and it uses conditional probabilities for computing fault trees where the 
same basic failure appears in more than one fault path. 
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Reliability Computation Using Fault Tree Analysis 
1. Introduction 
This report describes a fault tree modeling technique 
having application to a variety of system analysis situations. 
The functional and mathematical methods discussed in this 
report are intended for use primarily in the areas of 
reliability and safety analysis-especially during the early 
desigr. phases of a Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) hard- 
ware development program. However, because of the 
flexibility of the fault tree technique, it can also be used on 
a mature design as an effective failure analysis and preven- 
tion device based on actual test and operational data inputs. 
Simply defined, a “fault tree” is a graphical representa- 
tion of the logic that relates certain specific events or 
primary failures to an ultimate undesired event. 
In reliability and systems analysis, a fault tree analysis has 
many uses. The fault tree technique can be used to perform 
a reliability analysis of a particularly important undesired 
event-either before a failure, as a prediction method, or 
after a failure, as a means for finding the most likely cause 
of failure.’ Fault tree techniques can also be used as a 
method for performing failure mode and effects analyses, 
system sensitivity studies, and safety analyses. (Reference 1 
I 
gives a more detailed discussion of fault tree safety 
analysis.) 
The fault tree technique of analyzing the system, by 
recording combinations of events in an easy-to-read dia- 
gram, lends itself readily to the use of probability estimates 
for the most critical elements of the system being diagram- 
med. In a simple analysis this information can be discov- 
ered by inspection. In more complex systems, an analytical 
method is usually necessary to utilize the fault tree most 
effectively. One such analytical technique is to assign 
probabilities of failure to the different elements of the fault 
tree, develop an algebraic expression representing the fault 
tree, and then obtain a probability of undesired event 
occurrence for the system represented by the fault tree. 
The aim of this report is twofold. The first aim is to 
discuss fault trees and their application and construction, 
including techniques for applying fault trees to systems 
incorporating standby redundancy. The second aim is to 
present a computerized method for performing the analyti- 
cal reduction and computation of fault trees. 
‘This was done at JPL as part of the analysis of the Surveyor 2 failure. A 
fault tree was used to stndy the possible causes of the tumbling of the 
spacecraft, which was apparently caused by engine 3 of the vernier 
propulsion subsystem failing to ignite. 
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II. The Fundamentals of Fault Tree 
Construction 
A. What Is a Fault Tree and How Is It Used? 
A fault tree is a unifying analysis tool. A fault tree 
provides a methodology for the reliability analysis of all 
hardware elements of the system (mechanical and electro- 
mechanical as well as electronic), as well as all factors that 
degrade system reliability. 
Chief among the advantages of the fault tree approach 
The “top-down” failure mode and effects analysis 
lends itself to better organization and more thor- 
ough analysis than a conventional failure mode and 
effects analysis. 
The fault tree, being a basic logic diagram of 
system, subsystem, and component faults, is directly 
amenable to probabilistic computation, and, as such, 
serves the same purpose as a reliability model. In 
general, fault trees are often event-oriented, 
whereas reliability predictions using reliability 
block diagrams are usually hardware-oriented. 
The system faults at the top of the fault tree can be 
immediately related, both functionally and pro1)ahi- 
listically, to detailed failures and problems. 
When used to analyze detailed assemblies, a fault 
tree makes obvious the interdependencies which 
always exist but which are frequently neglected in a 
reliability model. 
are the following 
(1) 
(2) 
(3)  
(4) 
Thus, a fault tree serves the function of a failure mode 
and effects analysis, while, at the same time, it provides the 
additional probabilistic information that a typical reliabil- 
i ty  analysis provides in the form of reliability block 
diagrams. Because the fault tree is a top-down approach, it 
can be halted at any hardware level and can be used to 
explore certain critical faults in greater depth than others. 
In summary, a fault tree offers sufficient flexibility to be 
practical for a number of different users-it is ;a “practical” 
failure mode analysis, a s  well as a single-point failure and/ 
or reliability prediction tool. 
A few ~iegative aspects of f a u l t  trees should be mcn- 
tioiied. It is ii “negative” or failure-oriented study of the 
system, riiilike a reliuldity block diagram that considrrs 
“success” modes. Sometimes this is a disadvantnge, but it  is 
pro1)ably inore frequently an advantage, since i t  orients the 
designer and the relialdity engineer to thinking of elimi- 
nating “single-point failure” situations in a design. Another 
disadvantage is that, if the fault tree analysis is carried to 
the piece-part level for a large system, the detail is 
overwhelming. In such a situation, a compromise approach 
would be necessary: the use of (1) the fault tree approach 
for the most critical functions and (2) a chart-form failure 
mode and effects analysis coupled with a standard reliabil- 
ity analysis for the rest of the system. 
B. Guidelines for Fault Tree Construction 
The construction of a fault tree begins by defining the 
topmost undesired event one wishes to analyze. This can be 
almost anything: an event as gross as “astronaut’s life 
endangered” or something more detailed, like “solar panels 
fail to deploy.” This undesired event becomes the output 
event of the fault tree and is placed at the top of the tree. 
The analyst then relates events that could cause this 
undesired event. The events are related through the use of 
logic symbols. Fault trees have been in use for many years 
and the symbology used has become standardized, as 
explained below. 
The two most important logic functions used in con- 
structing fault trees are the AND gate and the OR gate. 
These are illustrated in Figs. 1 aiid 2. There are several 
variations of these basic functions. They are the INHIBIT 
gate, the PRIORITY AND gate, and the EXCLUSIVE OR 
gate. Because the PRIORITY AND gate and the EXCLU- 
SIVE OR gate were found, through experience, to have 
little real value in fault tree construction, they were not 
used in the modeling technique discussed in this report. 
The “INHIBIT gate,” another commonly used gate, with 
application mainly for safety analyses, is illustrated in Fig. 
3. The INHIBIT gate is generally used as an AND gate 
except that the input event is entered in a failure rate 
fashion and the side condition is described as a probability. 
Situations requiring the use of an INHIBIT gate do not 
arise very frequently when the fault tree is used as a 
reliability tool; thus this symbol is not used as an INHIBIT 
gate at JPL. Also, the program described in this report will 
accept either probabilities or failure rates as basic inputs, 
so that an INHIBIT gate can be handled as an AND gate. 
With the hexagon thus freed from use a s  an INHIBIT 
gate, i t  can be used a s  a STANDBY gate in describing 
systems incorporating standby redundancy. The STANDBY 
gate is illustrated in Fig. 4. 
The STANDBY gate behaves somewhat like an AND 
gnte except that a priority is involved. The prime path 
must fail before the backup is considered. Thus, in the 
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SYMBOL OUTPUT Y SYMBOL OUTPUT Y 
x, Rn x2 ... x 
x, x* 0 . .  Xn 
INPUT EVENTS 
EQUIVALENT BOOLEAN EXPRESSION 
Y = x, + x2 + ... + Xn 
MEANING: IF ANY OF THE EVENTS 
Xi  OCCUR, THEN THE EVENT Y WILL 
OCCUR. 
EQUIVALENT BOOLEAN EXPRESSION 
Y’X, * x2 ... e x n  
MEANING: ALL EVENTS X i  MUST 
OCCUR FOR EVENT Y TO OCCUR 
EXAMPLE 
EXAMPLE 
DO NOT DEPLOY 
UPON COMMAND MODE NOT 
TURNED ON 
SOLAR PANEL 
DEPLOYMENT 
MECHANISM 1 FAILS COMMAND LOG IC FAILURE PREVENTS TURNING ON DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM I NOT TURNED COMMAND 
I I 
DISCUSSION: 
CENTRAL SFQIJENCER AND THE GROlJND 
COMMAND MUST FAIL TO TURN THE HIGH- 
POWER MODE ON FOR THE HIGH POWER 
MODE NOT TO BE TURNED ON. 
IN THE EXAMPLE, BOTH THE 
Fig. 1. AND gate 
DISCUSSION: IN THE EXAMPLE, 
EITHER A DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM 
FAILURE A COMMAND LOGIC 
FAILURE WILL PREVENT THE SOLAR 
PANELS FROM DEPLOYING. 
Fig. 2. OR gate 
example involving traveling wave tube (TWT) transmitters, 
the output event, “transmitters fail,” occurs if both the 
good or prime input occurs, “TWT 1 fails,” and the 
backup event occurs, TWT 2 fails, or various switching 
events or failures will cause the output event to occur. The 
particulars of how the switch can be considered will be 
treated later-there are several options. 
SYMBOL 
OUTPUT EVENT 
DES CRI PTlO N -CONDITION 
INPUT EVEN1 
MEANING: IF THE INPUT EVENT OCCURS A N D  
THE CONDITION IS SATISFIED, THEN THE OUT- 
PUT EVENT WILL OCCUR. 
Fig. 3. Standard INHIBIT gate-not used in this program 
The above-mentioned symbols are used to represent the 
logic for the fault tree. There are also three standard 
symbols used to represent ecents in the fault tree; these are 
illustrated in Fig. 5. In addition to these symbols, a triangle 
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SYMBOL 
OUTPUT EVENT 
SENSING AND 
SWITCH1 N G  > 
INPUT ‘‘ I EVENT \ INPUT EVENT OF 
OF THE PRIME 
OR NORMALLY STANDBY OR 
G O O D  PATH 
THE BACKUP OR 
DORMANT PATH - - 
EXAMPLE 
TRANSMITTERS 
FA1 L 
FA I LS 
TWT BACKUP 
TRANSMITTER 2 
FA1 LS 
Fig. 4. STANDBY gate 
is often used to indicate a transfer of ii fault tree path to 
another portion of the fault tree. 
The actual construction of the fault tree is accomplished 
by the analyst’s relating the top block, through logic 
symhols, to specific events, then relating these events to 
more specific, events, unt i l  the an;ilysis is carried to the 
functional level tlesirctl. Each seqiicticc of events that l e d s  
to the ultimate undesired event is called ii “ f m l t  path.” 
Fault tree construction is prolxibly best rintlcrstootl I)y 
studying examples. Figure 6 is ;in example of ii rclialdity 
4 
A N  EVENT--USUALLY A MALCONDI- 
T lON OR FAULT 
/-\ 
A N  EVENT AT WHICH THE FAULT 
SEQUENCE I S  TERMINATED FOR LACK 
OF INFORMATION OR SUFFICIENT 
CONSEQUENCE. IT  IS USED WHETHER 
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AT A LATER 
TIME I S  INTENDED OR NOT. 
0 
A N  EVENT DESCRIBED BY A BASIC SYS- 
TEM COMPONENT OR PART FAILURE 
Fig. 5. Fault tree event symbols 
fault tree. Further examples can be found in Section IV of 
this report and in  Ref. 1. 
If it is desired to perform a mathematical analysis of the 
fault tree, a11 sequences of events must be carried to basic 
failures, that is, events for which it is possible to obtain a 
numerical probability of occurrence. 
This brings up a special problem. It is not always easy to 
get realistic and meaningful probabilities for all basic 
failure situations. For part and component failures, there 
are several puldications that are useful for deriving failure 
rate data that are meaningful for space environments (see 
Refs. 2, 3, and 4). Human problems are much more difficult 
to predict realistically, since human errors must be consid- 
ered inadvertent and, as such, are difficult to describe with 
numerical pro1)abilities. Ordinarily, large-scale flight simu- 
lators are the only good means for getting such data. 
As in all useful models, the problem of getting meaning- 
ful input data is of paramount importance to the fault tree 
validity and worth. To ensure achieving such lofty objec- 
tives, the fiiult tree analyst must have a practical personal 
knowledge of the system being analyzed and a good 
understanding of its relationships with interfacing subsys- 
tems or systems. This requires the analyst to have a 
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I SOLAR PANEL I 
FAILS TO I DEPLOY I 
I
DEPLOYMENT 
MECHANISM 
FA I LS 
BIND OR 
OTHERWISE 
FAIL TO 
DEPLOY 
FAIL TO 
UNLATCH 
PANEL 
NOT RECEIVED BY 
PY ROTECHN I C S UB S YS TEM 
A A 
/CENTRAL \ \ 
\ MENT COMMAND/ \ / 
thorough understanding of the basic workings of the system 
under study, plus an ability to visualize the operation of the 
system in the environment it was designed and packaged 
for. This can be no mean feat, especially in the earlier 
design stages of a system's development, when many of the 
more important mission profile elements necessary for an 
accurate fault tree study turn out to be fuzzily defined. 
Interesting!y, this type of situation exposes one of the 
important advantages of fault tree analysis: its flexibility in 
being easily modified as situations develop or goals are 
altered, not only with realism within the framework of the 
task, but also (by use of the modeling technique described 
in this report) within a short time. 
111. Fault Tree Mathematics 
A. The Monte Carlo Method vs. the Analytical 
Method 
The mathematics of fault trees can become quite com- 
plicated in the computational sense. There are two general 
ways to handle fault tree mathematics: the Monte Carlo 
Method and the analytical method. The Monte Carlo 
method describes the fault tree with Boolean expressions 
and then simulates the fault tree on a fast, large-capacity 
computer using Monte Carlo techniques. One of the 
advantages of this method is that it allows for such things as 
repair time to be inserted for each input block as well as its 
associated failure probability. Repair time considerations 
are very important for modeling repairable systems, such as 
an aircraft system or any system that can be given periodic 
maintenance. An example of the use of the Monte Carlo 
method is described in Ref. 1. 
The main disadvantage of the Monte Carlo method is the 
large number of simulations needed for statistical accuracy 
(many thousands, or, more often, millions of simulations). 
This, unfortunately, can be very time-consuming and 
expensive, even on a very fast, large-capacity computer. 
Also, in a normal JPL project, the opportunity to  insert 
repair time is not a valid argument for the Monte Carlo 
method since, for unmanned JPL space programs, repair 
times are not usually relevant, because there are no man- 
rated maintenance situations. 
Therefore, the Monte Carlo method was not chosen for 
the mathematical portion of the fault tree analysis. In 
practice, it appeared that an analytical method of modeling 
(by deriving the ultimate event directly as a function of the 
probabilities of the individual input events) would certainly 
be a valid technique, as well as being more practical for 
JPL needs. Unfortunately, a large problem with the 
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analytical approach is that deriving the formula for the 
fault tree by hand is a very complicated procedure for all 
but the simplest of fault trees, and there were no general 
computer programs available for developing this formula 
through the use of a computer. But, since such general 
programs are available for reliability block diagrams (Refs. 
5 and 6), it was decided to develop a companion technique 
for using an anslytical approach to fault tree modeling. 
This report will describe how, by taking advantage of the 
logic similarities of fault trees and reliability block dia- 
grams, a general computer program was developed that 
takes the fault tree as input, gives as an output the formula 
describing the probability of the fault tree, and performs 
the calculations for the probability of system failure, using 
the basic known input probabilities. This program is 
listed in JPL Technical Meniorandum 33-506 (Ref. 7 )  and is 
discussed in Section IV. 
6. A Description of the Analytical Method 
An important (and useful) property of fault trees is their 
logic similarity to reliability block diagrams. For instance, 
consider an AND gate (Fig. 7). Events X,, X,, . . ., X,, must 
all fail in order to cause X to fail. Therefore, letting P be 
proMAity of success and P b e  proM)iIity of failure, or 1 - 
P, we have 
F ( x )  = P ( X , ) .  P ( X J  . . . P ( X J  
But this is also the formula for the reliability block diagrani 
of X,, . . ., X ,  in parallel. Similarly, an OR gate can he 
considered as a reliability block diagram with the blocks in 
series. This is also illustrated in Fig. 7. 
The standby gate is a more difficult gate to analyze. It is 
probably easiest to consider the form that we want the 
equivalent block diagram to be. The program (Ref. 6) that 
we  use to compute the reliability block diagrams stores 
standby redundancy a s  follows: 
SENSING A N D  
SWITCHING 
PRIME (ACTIVE) 
BLOCK 
DORMANT OR ~-XF--l-+ 
The information is stored hy the program by storing the 
fact that hlocks 1 and 2 input to Mock :3, plus the 
information in another array that block 3 is a sense-switch 
block that controls the standby block 2. Thus, we wish to 
convert the information contained in a STANDBY gate to 
the form of the reliability block diagram above. This can be 
done in two simple stages. The STANDBY gate is con- 
verted to a fault tree using only AND and OR gates as 
follows: 
The  fault tree on the right is then converted to a 
reliability block diagram using the rules for AND and OR 
gates, and the resulting diagram (with the additional 
information that one is a sense-switch and one is a dormant 
block) is of the form needed. The figure above would 
indicate that the switch is in series with the standby system 
of the active and dormant path. This is not the case. It is 
drawn in series for convenience, but the actual behavior 
and effect of a failure in  the sensing and switching can be 
varied. This will be considered later when we discuss 
switching options. 
The rules above can be applied many times. Thus, when 
one has a large fault tree, a repeated application of the 
rules to AND, OR, and STANDBY gates will reduce the 
fault tree to a reliability block diagram. This is illustrated in 
Figs. 8 and 9. 
Often in fiiult trees it is convenient to have the same 
basic fault appear in several fault paths. When this occitrs, 
it can not be handled directly as it was above--an atltlitional 
point must be considered. When a basic failitre occurs 
more than once in a fault tree, it will also appear more than 
once in the equivalent reliability block diagram. The 
physical meaning of the block’s appearing for multiple 
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A N D  GATE 
‘n x, x2 ................. 
P(X) = P(X1) P(X,) * . . . - P(Xn) 
PROBABILITY: - - 
EQUIVALENT RELIABILITY BLOCK 
DIAGRAM: 
Ixl OR GATE 
x1 . .. xn 
PROBABILITY: 
P(X) = P(X,) * P(X,) . . . P(Xn) 
EQUIVALENT RELl AB I Ll TY BLOCK 
DIAGRAM: 
[ x i  H x 2  t- ... 4 7 1  
Fig. 7. Similarities of fault trees and reliability block diagrams 
times is that the same piece of hardware appears in several 
success paths for the convenience of describing the success 
relationships. When such blocks appear several times, they 
are called “equivalent” blocks, and must not be treated as 
independent blocks. Since the program used for computing 
the system reliability can handle most arrangements of 
“equivalent” blocks, this does not present a problem. 
Thus, “equivalent” blocks occur in the reliability block 
diagram when a basic failure appears more than once in the 
fault tree. There are a few restrictions in this program as to 
1 
X 
I 
1 I I  
Fig. 8. An example of a fault tree. Low-level faults 1-12 are related to 
the system-level fault X 
w I ‘  
Fig. 9. The equivalent relifbility block diagram for the fault 
tree of Fig. 8 
when the same basic failure can, or cannot, start more than 
one fault path. These restrictions are as follows: 
(1) If the same basic failure appears multiply, but only 
in the active portion of the fault tree (i.e., not under 
a STANDBY gate), there are no restrictions. 
If a basic failure appears under a STANDBY gate, 
then if it appears multiply, all other occurrences 
must be in the same branch of the STANDBY gate. 
Thus, one can have the same failure appearing 
several times in the active (prime) or standby 
(dormant) portion of the tree, but not in  1)oth. This 
second restriction is undesirable. However, if a 
situation like this arises, it is often possible to avoid 
it by modifying the fault tree slightly.2 
(2) 
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Thus, a fault tree that uses the logic symbols AND, OR, 
and STANDBY can be converted to a reliability block 
diagram as described above. Computer programs able to 
handle reliability block diagrams have already been devel- 
oped, so if we can develop a program to convert fault trees 
to block diagrams, then we can completely handle the 
mathematics of fault trees by the use of a computer. 
IV. The Fault Tree Computer Program 
A. Objectives 
The objective of this effort was to produce ii computer 
program to: 
(1) Analyzc fault trees which use AND, OR, or 
STANDBY gates to describe their logic. 
(2) Allow the fault tree to be entered into the computer 
in as simple a format as possihle. 
(,3) Includc in the printout enough information so that it 
is possible to write out the formula that is iised to 
calcrtlate the prol)al)ility for the fault trcc. 
(4) Be able to show the sensitivity of system failure to 
individual block unreliahility by varying the proba- 
bilities for the individual blocks during execution of 
the program 
B. Methods 
The computer program written to satisfy the objectives 
above is in  three parts. The first part converts the f s  dit 1 t tree 
to ii relia1)ility block diagram, the second part analyzes the 
relialdity block diagram, and the third part computes the 
prolxildity. The second part, which uses the proba1)ility 
tree method, is :in adaptation of the program discussed in 
Ref. 6. The details of the second and third parts will not be 
discussed here since they arc discussed in  detail in Ref. 6. 
The program was written in FOHTRAN V to run on :i 
Univac 1108, Exec. 8 system. 
C. Program Limitations 
To accommodate the storage capacity of the Univac 
(1) The fault tree can have at most 49 input blocks 
(basic failures). This is not a serious restriction. If the 
fault tree is larger, it is er,!y nzccssarj.. te break it 
into portinn<, ~ n m p ~ t e  th  pnrtinnr, and then enter 
each portion as one input block on another run. It is 
important then that each portion is independent of 
each other. 
1108, the following limitations were assumed: 
There can be at most 14 inputs to any AND or OR 
gate. This means 14 real inputs, which means 14 
inputs after the fault tree has been reduced to its 
simplest terms. This is illustrated in Fig. 10. This 
problem might not be obvious when the fault tree is 
entered, since the tree need not be entered in its 
reduced form. However, the program reduces the 
fault tree to its simplest terms. Thus, if a gate has 
more than 14 inputs, an error message is printed. If 
this should happen, it is simple to break the diagram 
into smaller portions and proceed as in (1). 
(3)  There can be at most 20 logic gates in any fault 
path. If more than this should occur, reduce the 
fault tree by combining consecutive AND or OR 
gates, or if this cannot be done, kreak the fault tree 
into portions and proceed as in (1). If dormancy is 
used in the tree, the maximum nuni1)er of logic gates 
in the fault path for the dormant elements is 19. 
4) There can be at most 200 success paths when the 
equivalent reliability block diagram is analyzed. The 
number of success paths depends on the complcxity 
of the fault tree. Since it is hard to know this ahead 
of time, an error message is printed if more than 200 
paths exist. If this should happen, it is simple to 
break the fault tree into smaller portions and 
proceed as in (1). 
D. Input 
The fault tree input is made as simple as possilde. To 
enter a tree, arbitrarily number each input block (basic 
faults) with numbers between 1 and 49. Each block must 
have ;I different number. Number the .4ND gates with ,401, 
A02, etc., the OR gates with 001, 002, etc. For STANDBY 
gates describing stnndby redundancy, it is important to 
know which input is which, and so the active, or normally 
good, input to the STANDBY gate is numbered with G01, 
G02, etc.; the standl)y, or dormant, input with D01, D02, 
etc. The input descri1)ing the switch used to switch in the 
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I 
A FAULT TREE 
4 
El  
THE SAME FAULT TREE REDUCED TO 
SIMPLEST TERMS 
Fig. 10. Reduction of a fault tree to its simplest form 
backup path when the path entering the G input of a 
STANDBY gate fails is entered as a switch with Sol, S02, 
etc. 
Assume there are n input blocks in the fault tree. The 
input cards will now be described. 
1. Fault paths. The fault paths (i.e., the description of 
the fault tree) are entered. the first n cards list the n fault 
paths in the following form (with one card per fault path): 
(1) Columns [l-2],3 the block number. Format (12). 
(2) Columns [3-51, [6-SI, . . . [60-621, identify all the 
gates that make up the fault path which starts with 
the block number punched in columns [l-21, listed 
from the bottom to the top. It is necessary to use 
one letter and two digits to identify each gate. (The 
FORTRAN format for entering the gate information 
is 20A3, the first alphanumeric character is the 
letter describing the gate (A for AND, 0 for OR, G, 
D, S for the normally good, dormant, and switch 
inputs to  STANDBY). The next two characters 
identify the number of the gate.) 
~ 
3Niiml~ers in brackets indicate column nnmbers. 
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(3)  The nth card must have a 1 in column [SO] to 
indicate that this is the end of the description of the 
faul t paths. 
If there are equivalent blocks or the same basic 
failure beginning more than one fault path, use the 
same number to begin each fault path. Thus, if “13” 
describes a failure block that begins three separate 
fault paths, there will be three “13” cards, one for 
each of the fault paths beginning at “13.” (In this 
case there will then be n + 2 fault path cards.) 
(4) 
2. Mission time. This card contains the failure distribu- 
tion information (1 = exponential, which is the only option 
currently available) and mission time (total number of 
hours). The card should be as follows: Column [ 11 blank, a 1 
in [2], mission time [3-141 (E12.7 format). For example, 
exponential distribution with mission time = 100,OOO h 
would have the following in columns [ 1-14]: 
bl + .1000000 +06 b = Blank in column one. 
3. Active parameters (failure rates and probabilities). 
This section contains one data card for each block number 
for all failures except failures in switch branches of 
STANDBY gates, with the block’s initial reliability R,  
(which is l-Qo, where Qo is the initial failure probability 
for the block) and failure rate (lambda). The format for 
these cards is block number [l-21, lambda [3-141 (E12.7 
format), R, [15-241 (F10.7 format). If [15-241 are left 
blank, Ro is set equal to 1.0 by the program. The data card 
for the last block number in this series has a 5 in [SO]. 
4. Dormant parameters. If there are no STANDBY gates, 
Sihections 4 and 5 are omitted. This section contains 
provisions for assigning a dormant failure rate (lambda 
dormant) to each failure block in a dormant path of a 
STANDBY gate. There are three options: 
(1) No failures occurring in dormancy-insert a blank 
card. 
Read in a dormancy factor on one card (blank [ 1-21, 
dormancy factor [3-141 (E12.7 format)), which the 
program will multiply by the active lambda of each 
standby block to yield the dormant lambdas for each 
standby block. 
Read the lambda dormant for each standby block 
individually. To do this, the first card will have a 99 
in [l-21, blank [3-SO]. Then read one data card for 
each standby block, with standby block [l-21 and 
lambda dormant [3-141 (E12.7 format). The data 
card for the last standby block in this series has a 6 
in [SO]. 
(2) 
(3) 
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5.  Switching options. This section describes the data 
input for each switch entering a STANDBY gate. Desig- 
nate one of the four switching options (0, 1 ,2 ,  3 )  with input 
cards as follows: 
0 = Perfect switching (probability of switch working = 
1.0). Sense switch number [l-21, blank [3-791, 0 in 
[Sci]. One input card per switch. 
1 = Constant probability that switch works. Sense 
switch number [ 1-21, blank [3-141, (pro1)ability [ 15- 
241 (F10.7 format), 1 in [80]. One input card per 
switch. 
2 = Dormant failure rate only for switch. Sense switch 
number [ 1-21, laml)da doriiiaiit [3-141 (E12.7 for- 
mat), 2 in  [80]. One input card. 
3 = Dormant and active failure rate for switch (2 cards 
per switch). Sense switch nuin1)er [ 1-21, lambda 
dormant [3-141 (E12.7 format), 3 in  [80]. Sense 
switch number [ 1-21, laml)da active [3-141 (E12.7 
format), 3 in [80]. 
Fig. 11. Example of Fig. 6, redrawn ready for input to the computer 
program 
If there is no standby redundnncy, no switch cards ;ire 
needed. 
6. Recalculation option card. This card is blank [ 1-79] 
and has the last column [80] set equal to 7, 8, or 9, as  
follows: 
7 = Recalciilate the diagram with the new parnmeters. 
The program will loop back and start reading from 
section 2 (mission time) through this section. This 
permits varying mission time, Ro, active/dormant 
lambdas, and switch options. 
8 = Read in a new fault tree and new parameters. The 
program will loop back and start reading from 
section 1 (fault path inputs). This permits varying 
fault tree confipr a t’  ions. 
9 = End of computer run.  
For a better understanding of the steps necessary for 
entering the fault tree into the computer, the exniiiple of 
Fig. 6 is retlrnwn la1)eling all gates and input events that are 
necessary for the conipiilcr input (Fig. I I ) .  Figure 12 then 
shows the format that woriltl be used IO enter this fault tree. 
Anotlier exmiple, this onc iiiore coiiiplicntctl, is illus- 
trated i n  Figs. 1 3  and 14. This exi i i i iple  is the fad l  tree of 
Fig. 8. 
10 
E. Output Controls 
The computer output can be controlled I)y certain 
variables. Some of the output is dependent on ;a program 
variable called IPRINT. 
The IPRINT varial)le is normally set b y  the program to 
be 0. When it is set to 0, only the fault tree (Pages 1 and 2 
in Section F), the paranieters, arid the result (Page 5 in 
Section F) are printed. This is the output usually desired by 
the user and nothing need be done by  the user for this 
option. It is, however, possible to override this by making 
the very first card of the data deck (the card that follows the 
@ XQT card) the following: IPRINT = n in the first 8 
columns, where n = 1, 2, 3, or 4 for the following print 
options: 
Option 1. In addition to the printout from option 0, the 
equivalent reliability block diagram as well as 
any modifications to the fault tree by the 
program are printed. This is described as Pages 
3 and 4 in  Section F. 
Option 2. Option 1 plus the overall probability trees 
developed to analyze the reliability block 
diagram. 
Option 3 .  Option 2 plus all protxability trees used by the 
program. 
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Fig. 12. Input cards for fault tree of Fig. 11 
L. Option 3 plus diagnostic information. 
If one wishes to use options 2 or 3, the printout obtained 
is described in Ref. 6 as well as very briefly below as Pages 
4a, 4b, and 4c. The output from option 4 is of use only to 
someone following through the program listing in great 
detail. The pages of printout are described in Subsection F. 
In addition to IPRINT, there is another variable that is 
normally set by the program but can be overridden by the 
user if desired. This option is controlled by the program 
variable NSIG and refers to the number of “significant” 
digits that will be printed for the computed system 
reliabilities. The term “significant” digits is defined in a 
very special way. The “significant” digits are the non-nine 
digits in the reliability number. Thus 0.99986, 0.975, and 
0.52 all have two “significant” digits. The value of NSIG is 
set equal to 3 by the program, and so three “significant” 
digits will be printed for the system reliability unless NSIG 
is specified as something else by the user. To do this, 
columns 9-15 of the first card of the data deck (the same 
card that contains the IPRINT specification if IPRINT is 
also being specified) contains 
,NSIG = n where n = 1 , 2 , .  . ., or 8. 
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Thus if both IPRINT and NSIG are being specified by 
the user, the first card of the data deck should look like the 
following in columns 1-15: 
IPRINT = 2, NSIG = 4 
x 
A 
Fig. 13. Figure 8 redrawn, numbering the gates for input to the 
computer program 
F. Detailed Program Output 
1. Page 1. The first page lists any sets of equivalent 
Hocks that have been assigned 1)y the program. This occurs 
when the sanie basic failure block (which was input by 
using the sanie numlm to start the fault path) occurs in  
several paths. An example might look like the following: 
I 1 =  7 I 
The nuiiilms 1 and 7 are the siiine fault, but are now 
listed a s  separate farilts, i.e. a s  different nuinl)ers, in the 
fault tree and in  the block diagram. However, when one 
evaluates the system equation for the proha1)ility for the 
system, the fact that 1 and 7 are the same fault is taken into 
account by use of conditional prolnbilities. 
2. Page 2. The fault tree is printed as a check for the user 
to be sure that the fault tree that was input was the one 
desired. If there are equivalent blocks, they are listed with 
separate numbers. Also, any switch blocks (Le., switch 
inputs to STANDBY gates) will be listed with the dormant 
blocks that they control. Typically, Page 2 looks like the 
following, which is the output for the fault tree described 
in Figs. 6, 11, and 12: 
FAULT TREE PATHS 
B L O C K  1 o m  002 
3. Page 3. This page is printed only if IPRINT # 0. It 
contains the modified fault tree and is usually needed only 
for diagnostic purposes. This page contains a listing of the 
fault paths with successive AND and OR gates removed, as 
well a s  with STANDBY gates converted to the equivalent 
AND, OR relationship described in Subsection 111-B. Note 
that these new AND and OR gates are denoted by D and S 
respectively. Typical modified fault tree paths are shown 
below: 
4. Page 4. Page 4 contains the equivalent reliability block 
diagram for the fault tree being analyzed. Any equivalent 
blocks or sense switches are listed. The relia1)ility block 
diagram is presented by listing the inputs and outputs of all 
blocks. It is easy to draw the block diagram from this 
listing. This page, which is printed only if IPRINT # 0, 
typically looks like the following: 
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R E L I A 3 I L I T V  BLOCK O I A S R A H  _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ -  
B L O C K  I I N P U T  3 4 
OUTPUT 2 
OUTPUT 50 
B L C C K  3 I N P U T  
OUTPUT 1 
B L O C K  50 I N F U T  2 
OUTFUT 
Since this listing identifies each block with its inputs and 
outputs, a unique reliability block diagram is described. 
This block diagram, when drawn out, looks like the 
following: 
3 2 
A BLOCK INSERTED TO ENSURE THAT 
THERE IS ONLY ONE OUTPUT BLOCK. 
SINCE ITS PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS 
I S  SET EQUAL TO 1 .O, I T  DOES NOT 
CONTRIBUTE TO THE CALCI?LAT!ONS. 
5. Page 5. Page 5 lists for each original block its active 
and dormant failure rate Ro unless Ro = 1.0, and its 
reliability unless it is a standby block replaced by a 
pseudoblock (which are numbered between 51-65). In the 
latter case, the reliability of the pseudoblock 51-65 will be 
printed. Each sense switch will have its active and dormant 
failure rate and probability printed. Then, the mission time 
and the reliability of the system are printed. This printed 
page typically looks like the example in Fig. 15. 
6. Other pages. In addition, several other pages are 
printed after Page 4 and before Page 5 if IPRINT = 2 is 
set. These contain information about the probability trees 
used to analyze the block diagram. A more detailed 
discussion of this information is contained in Ref. 6, where 
reliability block diagrams are discussed. These pages are as 
follows: 
Page 4a. This lists the success paths of the probabil- 
ity tree. Plus numbers indicate a success, while 
minus numbers indicate a failure. Each path of the 
probability tree is indicated by up to two lines of 
print, consisting of up to 50 numbers. Note that this 
information about the probability tree is not needed 
by the casual user. It is from this tree that one can 
derive the system reliability equation that is used in 
the computation phase of the program. This is also 
true for Pages 5 and 6 listed below. The output page 
containing the probability tree would typically look 
like the following: 
I 5 0 2 1 3  
I E C  2 t - 3  4 
This is the probability tree for the original block 
diagram. If there is no standby (no sense switches) 
then the system reliability equation can be derived 
from this tree. This is done by taking the product of 
the probabilities in each success path and summing 
this over all the success paths. The equation for the 
example shown above would be 
- 
4) 
(Pws - P S 0  - P ,  * P ,  * P3 + P S 0 .  P ,  - P ,  - 9, * P 
Page 4b. When standby redundancy is present, 
pseudoblocks are often needed when there is more 
than one block in the dormant path. These pseudo- 
blocks are designated with numbers 51-65. All 
places where pseudoblocks are used are listed along 
with the standby probability trees that they replace 
(the success routes of the standby system). 
Page 4c. If Page 4b is printed, Page 4c is printed 
also. It lists the original probability tree (Page 2) 
with standby blocks (51-65) replacing their respec- 
tive standby trees. This replacement usually causes a 
reduction of the number of original success paths. 
Pages 6 and 7 are printed only if IPRINT 32.  They 
are generally not of interest to the user. They are 
needed, however, to actually derive the system 
reliability equation when standby redundancy is 
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present. The terms I 
Fig. 14. The input for the fault tree of Fig. 13 
and E can be derived from this 
informatioil. These terms are described in Ref. 6, 
and this would be neetlcd to fitlly understand the 
information on these pages. 
7. Some exnmples. Tlic o i i tp t s  ;ire givcir (for t11c irortri;il 
IPHIN'I' = 0) option f o r  the two examplcs wliosc itiliitts 
were illitstratctl. The output for the exaliiple of Figs. 6, 1 I ,  
and 12 was shown in Su1)sectioti E-5. The oiitliitt f o r  thc 
example of Figs. 13 atid 14 is showti in Fig. 16. 
14 
I 
i 
V. Summary 
Fault tree analysis is a powerful reliability analysis tool as 
well a s  a safety analysis tool. This report has described a 
method (arid a computer program) that allows one to obtain 
a prediction from the fault tree. This method includes 
aiialytical derivation of the pro1)ahility ecpition for the 
utrtlcsired event being analyzed; it is not a simulation. 
Cotrtlitional probabilities make it possible to compute fault 
trecs in which the same basic failure ends more than one 
falllt path. 
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Fig. 14 (contd) 
Fig. 15. Typical example, Page 5 output 
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F A U L T  T R E E  PATHS 
B L O C K  1 001 A02 002 
BLOCK 1 
B L O C K  2 
BLOCK 3 
B L O C K  4 
BLOCK 5 
B L O C K  6 
BLOCK 7 
B L O C K  8 
BLOCK 9 
B L O C K  10 
BLOCK 11 
B L O C K  12 
BLOCK 50 
B L O C K  5 1  
B L O C K  3 A 0 1  A32 002 
BLOCK 4 A 0 1  A 0 2  002 
_BLOCK 5- A 0 3 -  002 . 
BLOCK 6 A 0 3  002 
B L O C K  7 A 0 4  002 
B-LOCK 9 A O ~   GO^ on2 
BLOCK xi A O ~  601 002 
B L D C K - _ l l -  --003- Dol- 002- 
BLOCK 12 003  D O 1  002 
B L O C K  13  SO1 002 002 
A C T I V E  T/R 
o5200000-06 
3000000-06 
5lOOOOO -06 
.s5oaooO-o6 
-2000000-05  
o30013000-06 
5900 000 -07 . ~ m o n n 0 - 0 6  
50 o o opo -I; 6 - 
-6500000-05 
o 9000 000 -I3 5 
6000000-06 
0 0000 000 
b-ORNANT F/R 
*0000000 . onooooo 
.uoagooo. . onooooo 
mooooooa - 0000000 
m c o o o a  . 0000000 
- 0 c 0-0 0.g 0- 
(. 0000000 
~ 9 O O C 1 0 0 0 - C 6  - 6000000-07 
.oooooI;o 
R- I N I T I A L  RELIABXLIT Y 
,949 3289+OOO 
a 97OQU 55 *OOE 
-9502787+000 
- 9 4 6 4 8 5 1 + O G O  
m8i8730a+uoo  
9704055+OGC 
-994 11 74+000 
9 5 122 94 +OOO 
*9512294+000 
.522045a+ooa 
-1OC 0000+001 
-6 7 80 a6 0 +ooa 
SENSE SUI-TCH A C T I V E  F / R  GO k m N  f--Fi-R P R O  B A B I L 
a L O C K  13  . ooooooo 1 5 0 O O O t H 7  l ~ * O O O O O O O  
R E L I A B I L I T Y  O F  THE S Y S T E H  THRI i  T I M E  I O C O O O .  HOURS = m9867 
~~ 
Fig. 16. The output for the example of Figs. 13 and 14 
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